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MEDIA LAW
I. CAROLINA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION CONSIDERED
PUBLIC BODY UNDER FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
In Weston v. Carolina Research & Development Foundation' the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the Carolina Research and
Development Foundation ("Foundation") is a public body under the
South Carolina Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).2 The court
followed the language of the FOIA rather than common-law distinctions
between private and public corporations and held that a private corpora-
tion may become a public body under the FOIA by receiving or
controlling state funds
The Foundation, an eleemosynary corporation incorporated under
the nonprofit corporation provisions of the South Carolina Code,4
operates solely for the benefit of the University of South Carolina
("University"). 5 During an investigation of the University's spending
practices, reporters sought records from the Foundation.6 Alleging that
the Foundation was a public body under the FOIA, The Greenville News
and the Associated Press brought action to obtain the Foundation's
financial records.7 The trial judge ruled that the Foundation was a public
body within the meaning of the FOIA, s and the supreme court affirmed
that ruling.9
In holding the Foundation subject to the FOIA, the supreme court
considered whether the Foundation fell within the FOIA's definition of
"public body."'" Beyond specifically listed groups, the FOIA defines
a public body as "any organization, corporation, or agency supported in
1. 303 S.C. 398, 401 S.E.2d 161 (1991).
2. Id. at 401, 401 S.E.2d at 163. The South Carolina Freedom of Information
Act is codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-4-10 to -110 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
3. Weston, 303 S.C. at 403-04, 401 S.E.2d at 164-65.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-31-10 to -450 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
5. Weston, 303 S.C. at 400, 401 S.E.2d at 162.
6. Foundation Is "Public Body" Under FOIA; Data Destroyed, NEws MEDIA &
L., Spring 1991, at 13.
7. Respondents Chris Weston and Multimedia, Inc., d/b/a The Greenville News-
Piedmont Company, and respondents John C. Shurr and the Associated Press
instituted two separate actions against the Foundation. Because the issues in the cases
were the same, the court consolidated the cases for appeal. Weston, 303 S.C. at 400
n.2, 401 S.E.2d at 162 n.2.
8. Id. at 400, 401 S.E.2d at 163.
9. Id. at 405, 401 S.E.2d at 165.
10. Id. at 400, 401 S.E.2d at 163.
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whole or in part by public funds or expending public funds."" The
court analyzed four specific Foundation transactions to reach the
conclusion that the Foundation receives support from and spends public
funds.12 The court stated in dicta that any one of these four transactions
alone would bring the Foundation within the FOIA's definition of public
body, but that taken together, the transactions lead to the "unavoidable
conclusion that the Foundation is a 'public body.""' 3
The court rejected the Foundation's contention that the common-law
distinctions between private and public corporations override the
language of the FOIA. Under common law, a corporation does not lose
its private status by receiving the support of public funds.14 However,
the Weston court found that the "unambiguous language of the FOIA
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
12. Weston, 303 S.C. at 401, 401 S.E.2d at 163. The first transaction concerned
the sale of the Wade Hampton Hotel, a student residence hall owned by the
University. When the University sold the hotel, the Foundation received $2,000,000
of the total consideration. The court held that, because the Foundation received these
funds in consideration for the sale of public real estate, the Foundation accepted
support from public funds. Id.
The second transaction concerned the development of the Swearingen
Engineering Center. The Foundation, acting as an agent of the University, accepted
and controlled the spending of $16,300,000 in federal grants. The court held that,
although the money may have gone solely to the Swearingen Engineering Center's
construction, the Foundation received partial support from public funds by using
University personnel in constructing the center. The court also noted that the
Foundation clearly directed the expenditure of public funds. Id. at 401-02, 401
S.E.2d at 163.
The third transaction concerned the development of the Koger Center. The
Foundation accepted a conveyance of cash and real estate from the City of Columbia
and a cash grant from Richland County. The court held that, by managing the
expenditure of these grants and the development of the real estate, the Foundation
received support from and spent public funds. Id. at 402, 401 S.E.2d at 164.
The last transaction the court considered concerned University research and
development contracts. The University received these contracts from private third
parties in exchange for research done by University employees. The University
routed these contracts through the Foundation, which retained 15 to 25% of the total
contract amount. The Foundation asserted that this sum was an administrative fee
earned for handling the contracts. However, the court held that, because the
Foundation did not show that its personnel performed any service to earn the fees,
the money represented support from public funds. Id. at 403, 401 S.E.2d at 164.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing Trustees of Columbia Academy v. Board of Trustees, 262 S.C.
117, 202 S.E.2d 860 (1974)).
[Vol. 44
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [], Art. 14
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/14
MEDIA LAW
mandates that the receipt of support in whole or in part from public funds
brings a corporation within the definition of a public body."'"
The court noted that the FOIA does not apply to business enterprises
that receive payment from public bodies in return for supplying specific
goods or services in an arms-length transaction. However, when a public
body diverts a block of funds to a related organization, or when a related
organization manages the expenditure of public funds, "the only way that
the public can determine with specificity how those funds were spent is
through access to the records and affairs of the organization receiving
and spending the funds."' 6
Under the court's interpretation of the statutory definition of public
body, an organization may be subject to the FOIA by: (1) taking money
from the sale of public real estate; (2) using public personnel; 7 (3)
directing the expenditure of public funds; (4) accepting real estate from
public bodies; or (5) charging a fee for handling public money without
producing evidence of service performed."8 Because the supreme court's
interpretation of the FOIA focuses on support from or expenditure of
public funds, entities that had previously been exempt from FOIA's
requirements may now come within the parameters of the Act. Any
organization "supported in whole or in part by public funds or expending
public funds" is a public body subject to the FOIA unless the organiza-
tion fits within a narrow statutory exemption.' 9
Questions concerning application of the FOIA should be resolved in
favor of coverage because the FOIA's broad definition of "public body"
exempts only certain public health-care facility committees.2" The broad
definition of public body under the FOIA reaches both local governmen-
tal and nongovernmental organizations. Organizations such as school
boards,2 ' building commissions," airport commissions," police de-
partments," and subcommittees of such bodies" are subject to the
15. Id.
16. Id. at 404, 401 S.E.2d at 165.
17. Id. at 401-02, 401 S.E.2d at 163.
18. Id. at 402-03, 401 S.E.2d at 164.
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
20. DAVID E. SHIPLEY, SOUTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8-4 (2d ed.
1989).
21. Cooper v. Bales, 268 S.C. 270, 233 S.E.2d 306 (1977).
22. Florence Morning News, Inc. v. Building Comm'n, 265 S.C. 389, 218
S.E.2d 881 (1975).
23. Multimedia, Inc. v. Greenville Airport Comm'n, 287 S.C. 521, 339 S.E.2d
884 (Ct. App. 1986).
24. Turner v. North Charleston Police Dep't, 290 S.C. 511, 351 S.E.2d 583 (Ct.
App. 1986).
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FOIA's requirements. If subcommittees and advisory committees of
public bodies are included in the FOIA's definition, organizations such
as the USC basketball coach search committee,26 the USC Faculty
Senate,27 the USC Research Advisory Committee,28 and the Law
School Steering Committee are subject to disclosing their records.29
Other organizations that may be subject to the FOIA's requirements
because of partial public funding include parent-teacher associations,
local band and athletic booster clubs, and local chambers of commerce.
Any private entity that receives and expends public funds, no matter how
small the amount, may be subject to the FOIA's requirements.
Given the supreme court's interpretation of the term "public body,"
the FOIA's definition of public records appears unusually broad. The
FOIA covers all records of private organizations that expend public
fumds;3° therefore, all records in the possession of a public body,
regardless of their origin or the reason for their creation or acquisition,
are public unless they fall under one of the specific statutory exemp-
tions.31 Taken at face value, the combination of a liberal definition of
public record and a broad definition of public body requires disclosure
of almost every record held by an organization that receives any public
funding. Any organization falling within the FOIA's definition of public
body is wholly subject to the record-keeping,32 notification,33 public
meeting,34 and disclosure requirements of the FOIA,35 even though the
organization depends chiefly on private actors and private funds.
Some states' freedom of information laws require that an organiza-
tion receive a particular percentage of public funding before being
subject to the requirements of the statute.36 These threshold require-
ments also exempt some nongovernmental organizations. However, the
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
26. 1991 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 91-42.
27. SHIPLEY, supra note 20, at 8-5.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
31. Id. § 30-4-20(c).
32. Id. § 30-4-90.
33. Id. § 30-4-80.
34. Id. § 30-4-60.
35. Id. § 30-4-30.
36. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.870 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986).
Kentucky's freedom of information law includes any body "which is created by state
or local authority in any branch of government or which derives at least twenty-five
percent (25%) of its funds from state or local authority." Id.
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threshold requirement does not apply the freedom of information laws to
an organization that falls below the funding threshold.
Neither the South Carolina statute nor those of other states provide
for bifurcation of funds for agencies partially supported by public
funds.37 Such a provision would allow private organizations to enjoy
some public funding while enabling citizens to monitor the expenditure
of state funds. However, strict separation of funds would be necessary
in order to avoid the mixing of private and public funds. Additionally,
a bifurcation provision would have to specify which meetings and
documents would be open to the public.
In Weston the court applied the FOIA to a private organization that
sheltered the expenditure of public funds from public scrutiny.3" The
FOIA, as interpreted by Weston, can subject essentially private organiza-
tions and private records to the FOIA's requirements. If an organization
is a public body, all records and meetings that do not fall within a
specific exception are public. If an organization is private, none of its
records or meetings fall within the FOIA. In the future, it may be
appropriate to seek a balance between expansive coverage and no
coverage through either a minimum funding standard or application of
the FOIA to only records and meetings that deal with public funds.
James E. Bradley
37. See Burt A. Braverman & Wesley R. Heppler, A Practical Review of State
Open Records Laws, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 720 (1981).
38. Weston v. Carolina Res. & Dev. Found., 303 S.C. 398, 404, 401 S.E.2d
161, 165 (1991).
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